From Engagement to Life, or: How to do things with gamification? by Ruffino, P
47
fRom engagement to life, 
oR: how to do thingS with 
gamification?
by Paolo Ruffino
intRoduction: what iS the PRoBlem with  
“engagement”?
Let us first outline the meaning of engagement, as it is presented in the 
literature on gamification. In those texts, engagement is one of the most used 
keywords. One of the best known texts about gamification, Gamification by 
Design (Zichermann and Cunningham 2011) starts precisely with a defini-
tion of the notion of engagement:
The term “engagement”, in a business sense, indicates the connection be-
tween a consumer and a product or service. Unsurprisingly, the term is 
also used to name the period in a romantic couple’s relationship during 
which they are preparing and planning to spend the rest of their lives to-
gether. Engagement is the period of time at which we have a great deal of 
connection with a person, place, thing or idea. (Ibid., xvi)
However, for Zichermann and Cunningham, this definition is problematic 
as it is too vague and difficult to apply in a marketing context. Therefore, 
they propose to create a metric to break down engagement: 
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We would be better off thinking of engagement as being comprised of a 
series of potentially interrelated metrics that combine to form a whole. 
These metrics are: recency, frequency, duration, virality, ratings. Col-
lectively, they can be amalgamated as an ‘E’ (or engagement) score.  
(Ibid., xvi)
Engagement is presented here as a “score”. The need to count, number and 
evaluate appears quite often in gamification. It is frequently brought for-
ward in order to record data and compare results. In one of the most often 
mentioned examples of gamification, what comes to be quantified is “life” 
itself. This is in fact what NikeFuel (2012), a recent development of the 
(2006) series of sport applications developed by Nike, states in its advertise-
ment:
Our minds, our bodies and our experience all tell us that movement is life 
and that the more we move the more we live. It’s something athletes have 
understood from the beginning. The kind of movement it takes to im-
prove your game is the kind of movement it takes to improve your life. But 
unlike sport, life doesn’t come with convenient ways of measuring move-
ment. So we developed one. NikeFuel: a single universal unit uniquely de-
signed to measure the movement of the entire human body for the entire 
human race, whatever your weight, whatever your gender, whatever your 
activity. It’s that simple and that revolutionary. So get out there, find what 
fuels you and get moving. (Nike Inc., 2013)
NikeFuel is a service based on a wearable technology that counts, via an ac-
celerometer, how much the body moves during its daily activities. In so do-
ing it provides a number, which is supposed to quantify movement – and life, 
which is allegedly the same thing. Again, what can be seen here is an attempt 
to engage sport practitioners, and potentially beginners, through a service 
that quantifies what would be otherwise difficult or problematic to quantify.
In this paper I will suggest that this specific idea of engagement, as it 
is presented in the books on gamification and its applications, has in fact 
a problem with the notion of life. Participation and involvement of the 
players should have an impact, in the theories of gamification, on their daily 
lives. However the ways in which this impact is performed brings about a 
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rather limiting concept of life, one that remains static rather than being in 
movement. 
What sort of notion of life and movement is performed by gamification 
apps? Nike+, for instance, connects to a mobile device and records, via GPS, 
and an accelerometer the path and pace of a runner. Nike+ is a system that is 
designed to receive and record already predicted signals; it rewards precise 
events, which are already expected by the simulation. It works as a system 
for recording and reviewing runners’ performances, and compares them 
with each other, on a local or global scale. The runner/player of Nike+ is 
brought to comply with a frame of rules, which works as a regulatory frame, 
where only specific events are expected, saved, calculated, and evaluated. 
Through this practice of compliance, the runner/player of Nike+ is normal-
ised, and regulates him or herself in order to maintain and progress in a 
process of constant self-normalisation. As Foucault notes (1977), discipli-
nary practices tend to optimise the body and stimulate its submissiveness. A 
mobile application such as Nike+ produces docile bodies while disciplining 
their sport activity and punishing their eventual failure. Failure here comes 
to be defined not only as failure to improve the body’s performance, but 
more subtly as failure to produce the expected data, to update the system as 
frequently as possible and to provide information about the body. Nike+ is 
not a game to play, but mostly to update.
There are many other examples of gamification apps that propose to 
motivate the player in sport and fitness practises. On a similar note, the 
game SuperBetter (2012), designed by Jane McGonigal, works in a similar 
fashion, while attempting to regulate physical and mental health. The goals 
to achieve (losing weight, running a marathon, connecting with friends and 
relatives and similar ones), and the tasks offered to reach such goals, pre-
scribe a limited set of possibilities for improving one’s life. Games such as 
Nike+ and SuperBetter tend to limit the possibilities of play, and can also 
be seen as conservative images of a way of living. Both games, or gaming 
platforms, offer a unique path to the achievement of well being, where what 
is defined as good for the body is catalogued and presented as necessarily 
positive.
It is from these considerations about the conservative visions of life that 
come to be performed by gamification apps that I propose to rethink our 
own possibilities for critical participation. I will suggest that reconsidering 
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life and movement can be crucial in rethinking engagement, gamification, 
and more generally the performativity of video games. I will do so through 
the work of anthropologist Tim Ingold, who has been closely inspired by 
Bergson’s notions of intuition, creativity, and vitalism. Bergson’s idea of life 
as movement, strikingly similar to Nike’s slogan, will be presented in its rad-
ical difference to what Nike and the gamification gurus have been proposing 
so far. Before going through the theories of Ingold and Bergson, I will look 
at how different perspectives on what gamification supposedly is and does 
have been expressed in the academic field. I will conclude the final section 
by pointing out how a certain idea of the performativity of video games, of 
their agency and effects, could be seen as replicated in ways that are not too 
greatly dissimilar from what gamification gurus have been promoting.
cRitiqueS of gamification
As a response to the emergence of gamification, one of the reactions in the 
academic world interested in digital gaming has been to propose a more 
moderate understanding of this newly emerging phenomenon, possibly 
eliminating the marketing aspects involved. It is from this context that 
Sebastian Deterding and colleagues have proposed a relatively simple defi-
nition of gamification: “gamification is the use of game design elements in 
non-game contexts” (Deterding et al. 2011, 2). The above quote has been 
accepted in the academic discourse over the last couple of years as a good 
description of the term gamification.
As reported by Deterding and colleagues, gamification is not the only 
term used to label the practice of adopting game design techniques in a non-
game experience:
Parallel terms continue being used and new ones are still being intro-
duced, such as “productivity games”, “surveillance entertainment”, “fun-
ware”, “playful design”, “behavioral games”, “game layer” or “applied gam-
ing”. Yet “gamification” has arguably managed to institutionalize itself as 
the common household term. (Ibid., 1)
The paper by Deterding and colleagues helps to define gamification beyond 
the enthusiastic talk that usually transpires in the uses of the term since Jane 
McGonigal made it popular through a series of TED talks and her book 
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Reality is Broken: Why Games Make Us Better and How They Can Change 
the World (2011). However, gamification has received a relatively large num-
ber of more or less consistent definitions and studies of the origin of the 
term and its political implications (Nelson 2012; Fuchs 2012; Jacobs 2012; 
Mosca 2012). This is partly due to the concept’s background. Gamification 
is in fact mostly a marketing concept, developed and promoted by designers 
and business consultants. In this context a clear and simple definition soon 
became a necessity in order to sell gamification to existing businesses (and 
sometimes also to public institutions). It is for this reason, probably, that 
most texts on gamification take the form of guidelines and instructions on 
how to gamify a certain experience. The term has been further defined in the 
academic context as well, simply replicating the how-to approach of many 
publications (e.g. “Gamification” module at Pennsylvania University, held 
by prof. Kevin Werbach, also seen in Werbach and Hunter 2012) or, occa-
sionally, articulating what else could be involved in the phenomenon (“Re-
thinking Gamification” workshop at Centre for Digital Cultures, Leuphana 
University, May 2013). 
Deterding and colleagues attempt to define gamification, but say little of 
what gamification does and what it could do, which I believe are much more 
relevant questions. These are in fact questions more directly challenging the 
discourse on the potential effects of digital games, which is what the promot-
ers of gamification insist on. The attempts to further elaborate what could be 
at stake with gamification are not many, and the present paper aims precisely 
at addressing this point. New definitions of gamification, in fact, would not 
yet tell us why we should be interested in it, and what we could make of it.
Ian Bogost has attempted to address a more nuanced question about 
gamification, firstly by saying that, from what we have seen so far, the tech-
nique should be renamed “exploitationware” (2011a) – or elsewhere, and 
more explicitly, “bullshit” (2011b) – and secondly by exploring the potential 
uses of video games in his text How to do Things with Videogames (2011c). 
His first argument can be summarised as follows. Gamification has little to 
do with the design of games, as it tends to reduce them to a predictable se-
ries of mechanisms to attract players / customers. Such mechanisms include 
the use of leaderboards, rankings, and badges to award the best players, 
as well as quick and unchallenging tasks to encourage players and make 
them feel gratified. However, Bogost argues game design (or at least “good” 
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game design) has been trying to complicate such techniques by introduc-
ing more varied tasks, demanding a variety of skills from the players and 
possibly questioning the experience of playing through complex narratives. 
Gamification does not attempt to achieve any of these goals, as it is uniquely 
interested in maximising the activity of the users, and potentially turning 
them into “better” customers, or unpaid contributors to their business. 
Therefore, according to Bogost, it should not be embellished by the word 
“game”, and should be more correctly called “exploitationware”.
Bogost also adds that “serious games” is instead a much fairer nomen-
clature than gamification. Bogost has supported on several occasions those 
games that show a political or activist agenda (for instance, in his work on 
“persuasive” games, 2007). Serious games, in fact, combine two apparently 
contradictory words to describe a challenge to the design of games through 
which players are supposed to question their own knowledge and beliefs. 
The serious aspect serves to distinguish these emerging kinds of video 
games from more facetious forms of entertainment (Bogost 2011a, 2011b). 
Bogost expands his view on serious games in the text How to do Things with 
Videogames (2011c). Here the reference to Austin’s How to do Things with 
Words (1962) is explicit, and so is the attempt to introduce a debate on the 
potential of video games from a perspective that is possibly more nuanced 
than the one seen in the context of gamification. This means, according to 
Bogost, that a better understanding of the potential of digital games entails 
an expansion of the number of things attainable from them: not only to be 
used as entertainment tools, or as part of marketing campaigns and self-help 
applications, as proposed in gamification, but also as objects with an artistic 
value, or as elements of social and political campaigns, and much more.
In How to do Things with Videogames, Bogost lists and analyses some 
of the possible uses for digital games that have recently emerged, including 
games with political content, promotional games displaying in-game adver-
tisements, games used for propaganda or activism and those with artistic 
purposes. He also discusses, through several short chapters, how games 
could provoke “empathy”, “reverence”, “relaxation”, “disinterest” and “drill”, 
among many other effects. Bogost argues that we can understand the rele-
vance of a medium by looking at the variety of things it does: “we can think 
of a medium’s explored uses as a spectrum, a possibility space that extends 
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from purely artistic uses at one end [. . .] to purely instrumental uses at the 
other [. . .]”  (2011c, 3).
Bogost’s answer to the debates on the potential of the medium of the 
video game is to avoid binaries and oppositions between serious and su-
perficial technologies. He proposes instead what he calls an ecological un-
derstanding of the medium, inspired by McLuhan and Postman’s theory 
of media. In this view, according to Bogost, media affect the environment 
where they are introduced at a variety of levels, not necessarily to be eval-
uated in positive or negative terms. Bogost’s response to gamification, and 
more broadly to the idea that video games can be used for achieving specific 
effects, contests the institutionalisation and appropriation from the side of 
the marketing context of the alleged transformations of the medium cur-
rently happening through the emergence of gamification. However, it does 
not yet tell us how the binaries he evokes could be further complicated and 
possibly surpassed, and therefore does not propose a way of thinking about 
video games that could be seen as radically different from what McGonigal, 
Zichermann and colleagues evangelise about.
The question of what we can do with video games receives a more varied 
response from Bogost, when compared with any of the gamification gurus. 
However, what persists is the idea that the medium of the video game has 
a certain impact on its users – an impact which could be more or less pre-
dicted and channelled through design.
While this and similar approaches to the study and design of video 
games can work well for specific purposes,1 I would like to propose differ-
ent questions, and not just for the sake of proposing something different, or 
because different is “good for its own sake”. I think instead that a process of 
rethinking gamification, while maybe not urgently needed in the marketing 
sector, is quite indispensible for the debates about the medium of the video 
game, where the performativity of games (and the theories about them) has 
yet to be investigated properly. 
1 See for example how the theories by Ian Bogost have been discussed in the debates on what 
is known as procedurality; seen as a method for both the critic and the design of video 
games that want to “communicate messages to players” through “rhetorical strategies” and 
arguments, each allegedly deriving from a specific component of a video game (Treanor et 
al., 2011). 
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In the following section, I will consider the question of gamification as 
proposed by both its gurus and detractors, and as rephrased by Bogost, with 
reference to Austin: as “how to do things with video games?” I will discuss 
how the anthropological perspective proposed by Tim Ingold (2010, 2011) 
can suggest how to rethink gamification, and not necessarily against the cur-
rent proposals originating from the non-academic contexts. The reason why 
Ingold’s perspectives could prove useful in this context is that they directly 
address how objects and things (the distinction soon to be debated) come to 
be constituted, and with what implications. I will argue, via Ingold, that the 
discourses on gamification tend to produce objects (gamified apps) allegedly 
composed of identifiable parts that can each potentially affect players. The 
theories against gamification contribute to this process of objectification by 
expanding it to the entire medium of the video game. I will now discuss how 
we could think differently about gamification in particular and video games 
in general. 
gamification and the life of thingS
I will be addressing this issue through the contribution provided by Tim 
Ingold, whose work, although not explicitly related to games or video 
games, questions the concept of performativity from an anthropological 
perspective. In the discourses about gamification the focus is on the agency 
of games: games can “do something” to their players, they have a certain 
power to affect players in a more or less predictable way. As Ingold would 
put it, agency is a term often brought into a debate in order to resuscitate the 
concept of materiality. In this view, objects have a certain material presence 
that does something to us; they have a certain agency with regard to the 
surrounding environment. However, Ingold suggests, while thinking in this 
way we tend to be suffocated by “the dead hand of materiality” (Ingold 2011, 
28). Ingold here means that agency and materiality are not only forms of ab-
straction that overshadow the nuanced relations between human beings and 
the surrounding environment, but, as concepts, they also actively produce 
this distinction. The distinction remains even when agency and materiality 
are nuanced and complicated and this is why they (metaphorically!) strangle 
our thinking. Through Ingold, I will question how this distinction is also 
replicated in the discourses on gamification, and I will attempt to articulate 
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a different reading of gamification by re-imagining the relation between hu-
man beings (players or game scholars) and video games.
In Ingold’s perspective a crucial role is played by the distinction be-
tween objects and things, which he draws on Martin Heidegger’s essay “The 
Thing” (1971). The distinction is useful in the context of my work because it 
helps to move from understanding engagement as the result of a cause-and-
effect relation (one in which video games do something to us or us to them). 
While drawing on Heidegger’s essay he comments:
The object stands before us as a fait accompli, presenting its congealed, 
outer surfaces to our inspection. It is defined by its very “overagainstness” 
in relation to the setting in which it is placed (Heidegger 1971, 167). The 
thing, by contrast, is a “going on”, or better, a place where several goings 
on become entwined. To observe a thing is not to be locked out but to be 
invited in to the gathering. (Ingold 2010, 4)
Ingold follows from this that things are constantly in contact with each other 
through their surfaces. This contact is what makes it possible for “things” to 
“gather” and participate in each other’s presence. Imagining the environ-
ment to be populated by objects suggests the image of an excavated world, 
similar to a piece of Swiss cheese (Ingold 2011, 24). Objects are seen here 
to be separated and abstracted from the environment. In this view, objects 
need to be “resuscitated” by what is commonly called “agency”. Instead, 
Ingold argues, things fill the environment and are entangled with one an-
other, in “a meshwork of interwoven lines of growth and movement” (Ingold 
2010, 4). Things are alive, as much as we are. The perspective offered by Ingold 
is more than an attempt to avoid a sort of horror vacui of an environment 
where objects are “cut” and surrounded by an empty space. There is still, for 
Ingold, the need to make sense of our own participations, as “things” our-
selves, participating in the world. He sums up his point saying, “[i]n effect, 
to render the life of things as the agency of objects is to effect a double 
reduction, of things to objects and of life to agency” (ibid., 7).
It is not my purpose to consider what Ingold names a “double reduc-
tion” to be necessarily negative, strangling, or a “dead hand”. It can in fact 
be said to be working fine in those contexts where engagement is intended 
as an effect, something that video games can do to their players. However, I 
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find Ingold’s theory interesting for the ways in which it thinks about partic-
ipation as “living” with and “within”, as a sort of co-existence, which I see as 
radically different from thinking in terms of engagement as “doing some-
thing to someone”. Through Ingold, we no longer pose the question of what 
video games (and gamified apps) can do to us, but of what it means to par-
ticipate and live in a world populated by video games.2
Life is here a crucial concept for Ingold, and he explicitly mentions 
Bergson and his Creative Evolution as one of the major influences for his 
work (ibid., 13). From Bergson, Ingold develops the notion of life as move-
ment and duration. Bergson argues that we, as humans, tend to capture the 
things around us intellectually, interrupting the flow of life to freeze, con-
trol, and transform things into forms. However, this process loses sight of 
movement. The intellectual faculty of our mind is accompanied by the in-
tuitive faculty, which we rarely exercise but which persists and occasionally 
comes through. Intuition, for Bergson, originates from the “vital impulse” 
shared by all living species. While intelligence is analytical, in that it divides 
and recomposes things in order to give us the knowledge we need to satisfy 
our needs, intuition instead gives us the knowledge of how things are in 
constant movement and always in the process of becoming other (Bergson 
1914 / 1907). 
Creativity is that which accounts for the continuity of life, the move-
ment of things, and at the same time for the discontinuity of such things, the 
2 Which is not the same question that Bogost proposes in Alien Phenomenology, Or, What 
It’s like to Be a Thing (2012). Bogost proposes an analysis of how objects, or things, expe-
rience the world surrounding them. In his attempt to reflect on what experience could 
be like outside of an anthropocentric view, and how this could lead to different morals 
and ethics, Bogost does not eliminate the essential alien quality of the objects/things he 
uses as examples. To interrogate ourselves on the “ethics of the spark plug, the piston, the 
fuel injector, or the gasoline” (Bogost 2012, 75) when looking at the engine of a car, can 
indeed be a different question from seeing how a car engine is entangled with human ac-
tivities. However, it is not yet telling us much about how the plug, piston, injector and gas-
oline “happen to us”, how come they have been divided as such, as separate and abstracted 
objects, and how such process of “cutting” the environment makes sense to us, what is at 
stake in it, and how it could be otherwise: In other words, we do not yet know from such an 
analysis of “aliens” how we are participating in the analysis itself, how we are in contact – 
physically, intellectually, or intuitively – with the engine of a car, or any other system. 
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diversity of matter that we tend to intellectually fixate in time and space. Our 
task, for Bergson, is to reconnect with the intuitive faculty and participate in 
the life of things, in order to reach absolute knowledge. What does it mean, 
then, for us, to creatively participate in such a “flow of life”? It means, first of 
all, that the very idea of the agency of objects of any sort (words, technolo-
gies, human beings, etc.) has to be rethought as being less a transitive action 
(doing something to someone else) and more a dynamic state of being, a 
property that allows things “to be alive” in the world. 
BRinging life into gamification (and game StudieS)
But what does it mean to be alive? More importantly, how can this be helpful 
for a study of gamification, or the study of video games more generally? In 
this section I will further articulate these questions through the work of Tim 
Ingold, Patrick Crogan and Henry Bergson. First I will discuss how Ingold 
sees the “world” or environment as composed of “materials”, and how this 
aspect recuperates a narrative side of theory as that which makes sense (and 
in fact constitutes) the properties of the things around us. With Crogan I will 
connect this way of looking at our engagement and presence in the world 
with a study of video games (and of what we can do with them). I will then 
investigate, through Bergson (in fact, a main reference in Ingold’s work), 
how this ultimately brings to the notions of movement and freedom as nec-
essarily connected to the ways in which we engage with the world. 
What I have addressed thus far as a problem of rethinking our engage-
ment with games is formulated by Ingold in different terms, as a problem of 
understanding life. The meanings of being alive, and ways of bringing things 
to life, are the main concerns of Ingold’s anthropological endeavour. He 
argues that the question of “life” is inherently connected to the physical pres-
ence of things in the environment, and that this question is hindered by the 
theories of materiality. Ingold argues that materiality is a concept derived 
from a sort of “academic perversion” (2011, 20). Ingold draws on Gibson’s 
theory of perception to suggest that it is in the problem of the boundary 
that materiality demonstrates its inconsistency. If we consider objects to be 
in contact, physically, with the external environment, to be immersed in 
different “materials”, then the boundary appears to be artificial. However, 
the problem, for Ingold, is not really in the artificiality of the boundary, but 
rather in what it offers in the understanding of our presence in the world, 
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and what it eliminates: “[M]aterials do not present themselves as tokens 
of some common essence – materiality – that endows every worldly entity 
with its inherent ‘objectness’ rather they partake in the very processes of the 
world’s ongoing generation and regeneration [. . .]” (ibid., 26).
Shifting the focus to materials, rather than materiality, is what allows 
Ingold to re-evaluate the human presence in the environment, an aspect he 
finds to be articulated, in the theories of agency, in a distinction human ver-
sus matter. He takes the example of a stone, which can become wet by being 
dropped in water. After a certain amount of time, water will evaporate and 
the stone will be dry. The appearance of the stone has indeed changed, and 
so have its properties. The wet stone will feel and sound different from the 
dry one. What can we say then of the “materiality” of the stone? Has the dry 
stone more “stoniness” than the wet stone? Ingold argues:
There is no way in which its stoniness can be understood apart from 
the ways it is caught up in the interchanges across its surface, between 
medium and substance [. . . T]he stone has actually changed as it dried 
out. Stoniness, then, is not the stone’s “nature”, in its materiality, nor is 
it merely in the mind of the observer or practitioner. Rather, it merges 
through the stone’s involvement in its total surroundings – including you, 
the observer – and from the manifold ways in which it is engaged in the 
currents of the lifeworld. (Ingold 2011, 32)
If the observer is also considered to be part of that same “lifeworld” of the 
things around him or her, then the distinction in quality and hierarchy be-
tween subject and object comes into dispute. Ingold ultimately proposes a 
different narrative of engagement, one that does not have much to share with 
the narrative that has been emerging in contemporary video game culture 
thus far, but that could tell us something about how we engage, also, with 
digital games. What he offers is indeed a different way of thinking about our 
own immersion in the world, as thinkers, doers, scholars, producers, and 
consumers. These practices, however, are thought less as transitive actions 
and more as what results from a co-presence of live materials.
The crucial aspect in Ingold’s theory that I would like to bring into the 
debate on gamification is that what ultimately comes to re-evaluation is the 
narrative aspect of theory. Rather than looking for the essential properties 
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of objects and their supposed effects, Ingold 
encourages the creation of narratives of those 
same properties in which different forms of 
participation are presented. However, those 
same narratives are immediately revealed as 
necessarily strategic and partial. They in fact 
actively constitute, each time they are per-
formed, the properties of which they talk about, by cutting a series of lines 
(as Ingold, 2007, puts it) to form new things. In this way Ingold recuperates 
the performative potential of theory, as that which is capable of bringing 
things to life through a narrative of our participation with them. 
How can this perspective prove useful when rethinking gamification, 
and how can it contribute to the study of digital games in general? Draw-
ing on Ingold’s approach to theory can prove useful when trying to counter 
the conservative side of gamified applications, as discussed earlier. In fact, 
Ingold does not simply propose a way of looking at things, but also to nar-
ratively rethink those same things and bring about new ones, possibly more 
interesting and, if needed, less conservative. Gamified systems, of which 
Nike+ and SuperBetter are examples, can in fact be seen as conservative 
tools, where unexpected and original ways of thinking about a specific prac-
tice are ruled out. But also, possibly, they are inevitably so. The struggle to 
eliminate uncertainty appears in the very origin of cybernetics and digital 
simulations. This is what Patrick Crogan argues in his text Gameplay Mode: 
War, Simulation and Technoculture (2011) through an analysis of the histor-
ical and ideological relations between the video game industry and military 
developments.
Crogan’s text can be seen as creating a link (although not intended 
by the author) between the Ingold’s theory and the field of game studies. 
Crogan in fact, while trying to reconsider the foundations of the approaches 
to the study of video games, similarly concludes in favour of a re-evaluation 
of the performative aspect of theory and its capacity to bring about spe-
cific realities. Crogan points out that the study of video games has tended 
towards an uncritical acceptance of the ideology of cybernetics (Crogan 
2011, 145). In Espen Aarseth’s (1997) original proposal for a study of “cyber-
texts” this meant the dismissal of a semiotic approach in the study of com-
puter games in favour of a study of the interpretation of “cybernetic signs”, 
What if we consider 
gamified systems  
to be part of that same world 
that it is claimed they  
are affecting?
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arbitrarily determined by the relation between a coded, invisible level and an 
expressive, visible level (ibid., 24–41). From Aarseth’s approach, computer 
programming determines not only the ways in which cybertexts, including 
computer games, are structured but also their interpretation: “[T]he concept 
of cybertext focuses on the mechanical organization of the text, by positing 
the intricacies of the medium as an integral part of the literary exchange” 
(ibid., 1). However, Crogan argues that the “intricacies of the medium”, as 
Aarseth puts it, derive from a specific ideology. It is the same ideology that 
has been framing military research and the study of simulations, as systems 
for the pre-emption of possible future events. His proposal is to counter, 
from an academic and artistic perspective, what he describes as:
[The] overarching tendency of the program industries to standardize and 
predetermine the nature of access and utilization of their products. Nev-
ertheless one can play, and design and co-create [. . .] or becoming the 
bugs, artifacts, mods, critical and creative readings and appropriation, 
and other accidental becomings that alter what we can do with games, 
what games do with us, and what they give us to think about what we are 
doing with them now and tomorrow. (Crogan 2011, 174–175)
Similarly to Ingold, Crogan also proposes to bring the focus on our possibil-
ities for reading creatively. Crogan’s contribution to the recurring question 
of how to do things with games, and of what they do to us, which I have 
argued is also the basis of the discourses surrounding gamification, is useful 
and relevant for a variety of reasons. First, Crogan highlights how the logic 
of the “war on contingency” subsumed by the military-industrial complex 
is not only important in the development of forms of digital entertainment, 
but is also present in the ways we (gamers and scholars) tend to make sense 
of these entertainment forms. Second, he proposes that one possible way of 
thinking outside of such weltanschauung is to rethink the physical presence 
of the players and the materiality of games and game technologies. The prob-
lem of materiality and of our physical and intuitive participation is seen by 
Crogan in the light of an historical and ideological background that shapes 
both the medium of the video game and the theory about it.
I would like to expand on these suggestions and connect Crogan’s analy-
sis of the medium of the video game with Ingold’s proposal for an anthropo-
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logical rethinking of the concepts of performativity, materiality, and agency. 
I believe that these two perspectives, distant from each other with regard to 
the objectives they aim to achieve, can in fact contribute by saying some-
thing different about gamification.
I think that what calls for some alternative modes of thinking is the 
rather unproductive dead-end into which gamification and its critique have 
confined themselves. Drawing on the introduction to this paper, the state-
ment “movement is life”, presented by Nike in the advertisement of Nike-
Fuel, is interpreted by the sport company as if being alive could somehow be 
a problem: “[L]ife doesn’t come with convenient ways of measuring move-
ment”, says the advertisement (Nike Inc., 2013). Nike’s response to this prob-
lem is that each singular activity of the body should come to be quantified 
and counted by the application. In doing so NikeFuel disregards movement 
as a process of knowledge, as wayfaring (in Ingold’s terms), and applies in-
stead a notion of movement as homogenous, and divisible into homogenous 
unities. In this sense, movement is spatialised here, as the notion of scientific 
time introduced by Bergson in his Time and Free Will: an Essay on the Imme-
diate Data of Consciousness (2001 / 1889). Bergson proposed that to account 
for duration we cannot limit ourselves to the scientific time but also allow 
an intuitive understanding of time and space. Scientific time, the kind of 
time we measure and quantify, is expressed through numbers. As such, it is 
based on the idea of a homogenous space as it implies the presence of a unit 
of measure, which is juxtaposed to the next unit, as if temporal units were 
linearly disposed. Spatialised time also brings the notions of determinism 
and causation, as individual moments are seen as one being the effect of the 
other, following one another in a cause-effect relation. 
The production of a “single universal way to measure all kinds of activ-
ities [. . . to track] your active life” (Nike, Inc., 2013) is another way of reg-
ulating movement, and in fact also performatively produce, in a Foucaltian 
sense, a notion of life as measurable and traceable through data. By tracing, 
measuring and quantifying, NikeFuel, and gamification in general, freeze 
movement and life through the separation and invention of fixities, through 
what Bergson would define as an intellectual approach, and replicating the 
notion of time that Bergson identifies as belonging to ancient Greek phi-
losophy (and Zeno’s conception of time and space in particular). Bergson’s 
contribution is highly relevant in the context of this paper because it is 
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ultimately concerned with the possibility of freedom within such a notion 
of time.
By introducing a question about life, rather than engagement, in the 
discourses about the things that we can do with games (and gamification) 
I have tried precisely to propose that we have freedom, that is, a multitude 
of possibilities of movement (not only physical but intuitive and creative). In 
the final part of this paper, I will attempt to map some possible ways for such 
forms of intervention which exemplify how a different way of “doing things 
with games” might take form. In these examples, taken mostly from the art 
context, our engagement with video games is understood through a different 
configuration, which inquires – rather than merely replicating – the duali-
ties and separations that tend to frame the processes of understanding of 
digital games. These proposals investigate the materials which video games 
are made of, and the significance of dwelling and playing in a world of mate-
rials. Yet, they also propose temporary fixities, cuts in an ongoing process of 
mediating our presence in such a world.3 
gaziRa BaBeli and game aRthRitiS: game StudieS By 
diffeRent meanS
The works I would like to introduce are by the artist Gazira Babeli (an avatar 
in the game Second Life) and a piece by Matteo Bittanti and the collective 
IOCOSE. In these investigations, conceived and presented mostly within the 
context of art galleries and festivals, I believe a suggestion can be found as 
to what else game studies could be, and on what is at stake in finding an 
alternative.
The work by Babeli that I would like to introduce is a piece she made in 
2006, entitled Come to Heaven. I will propose to look at this performance as 
a potentially different perspective on the relationship between digital games 
3 The perspective I propose while looking at these two examples is strongly inspired by 
Sarah Kember and Joanna Zylinska’s work Life After new Media: Mediation as Vital 
Process (2012). I do not articulate this reference much further in this context, for the sake 
of brevity, but I encourage exploring their approach. Kember and Zylinska look at possible 
ways for “doing things” with media, as a form of invention and scholarly critique. The 
theoretical foundation for their intervention is also strongly inspired by Bergson’s vitalism, 
although much more fully developed in their text than in this paper.
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and the materials they are made of, the ways in which games are played 
and how they can be understood to reach unexpected results. I suggest 
that thinking about video games in the terms proposed by Babeli entails, 
possibly, looking less at the performativity of games and more at games as 
“performers”. In the example I will now introduce I believe this happens in 
quite an interesting way. I propose that this artistic investigation explores the 
materials of which video games are made, and our co-existence with these 
materials, in a way, which is radically alternative (although not intentionally, 
considering its date of publication) to the ways in which the question of per-
formativity is currently debated with regard to gamification. 
Babeli was a code performer, and avatar in Second Life (2003) – her 
artistic career was intentionally stopped a few years ago, so it is appropriate 
to talk about her in the past tense, as a dead artist. Her work investigated 
the possibility of performing in a digital online environment such as Second 
Life. In Come to Heaven (2006), one of the pieces I find to be most relevant 
to her career, Babeli lets her avatar (her “body” in the digital simulation) fall 
from a very high point in the sky of Second Life. While falling, the 3D model 
of the avatar tends to lose its integrity, and generates a series of unpredictable 
glitches.4 
Babeli’s work centres on one essential property of digital simulations. 
That is, digital simulations, by participating in the “war on contingency” (as 
proposed by Crogan), will replicate the same script with the same identical 
results, regardless of the spatial and temporal context where the script is per-
formed. Babeli’s intervention consists in allowing her avatar to automatically 
repeat the same script, which forces the avatar to fly up to the highest point 
in the digital simulation and then freefall down to the ground. She repeated 
the same script on different computers, with different hardware and at differ-
ent times of day (i.e. with different Internet connection speeds and traffic).
The outcome of her work is a series of still images of the falls. The 
performance stresses the graphic engine of the game and the graphic ca-
pabilities of each of the computers on which the same code is performed 
(or, rather, “performs”). Babeli highlights the unpredictability of the engine 
4 Documentation of Babeli’s Come to Heaven is available online at: http://www.gazirababeli.
com/cometoheaven.php (accessed May 6, 2014). 
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itself, which mixes the textures of the 3D model in different ways each time 
it is run. At stake here is not only a way of playing with the logic of the script. 
Babeli, more interestingly, questions the iterability of the code, which makes 
it reliable and worthwhile, through the material from which the computers 
are made. 
Babeli’s crucial move is that she does not play the video game Second 
Life, but rather sets it up to perform itself. She is not producing, or consum-
ing the game. Babeli’s intervention is not, simply, a form of re-appropriation 
of the game product, or a form of “active consumerism”. Indeed, she had to 
program the script beforehand, take the screenshots and so on, but the inter-
esting part of the work is when the hardware performs such a script, when 
the game plays itself and makes itself visible for the materials from which it 
is made. It becomes crucial, in Babeli’s concept, to document and report not 
only the screenshots of the performance but also the precise hardware that 
has been performing in each instance. Graphic cards, CPUs, and RAMs are 
the performers, communicating with the Second Life servers in California, 
and unpredictably generating graphic deformations while overheating and 
“crashing”. As Babeli comments, “[. . .] millions of meters away, at a very 
high speed. The effect obtained on the graphic card of the computer is hard 
to anticipate and it depends on the creativity process of the card itself. Yes, 
cards go bananas [. . .]” (Gazira Babeli 2006).
Letting cards go bananas is, potentially, one of the many ways to in-
vestigate how the narrative of pre-emption (as Crogan would put it), which 
underlies the computer script, can be narrated otherwise. Babeli’s work does 
not offer an answer, neither it does crystallise into a technique for “doing 
things with games”. It rather offers a temporary perspective on what else 
scripts, and video games, are, what they are made of, and how our ideas about 
them can be challenged by inquiring into such material presence. Babeli 
offers what Crogan, through Samuel Weber, has defined as a “theatrical” 
gesture (Crogan 2011, 141), which questions our participation in the video 
game Second Life, looks at what this participation is made of and how does 
it happen rather than, too simply, framing the answer on a cause-effect or 
producer-consumer binary.
Another example that similarly inquires about the ways in which we live 
and co-exist with video games is Game Arthritis. Game Arthritis is an art 
project presented at the Venice Biennale in 2011 by Matteo Bittanti, adjunct 
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professor at the California College of the Arts, and the collective IOCOSE, 
of which I have myself been a member since its inception in 2006. Game 
Arthritis (2011) is a photographic documentation of a “systemic study of 
video game induced diseases”.5 It investigates the topic of the alleged effects 
of video games, particularly from the angle of medical and scientific dis-
course. Moreover, it questions the ways in which we tend to narrate what 
video games do to us, and us to them. The project is inspired by, and directly 
refers to, a series of publications that, until the early 2000s, claimed that 
video games would affect an entire generation of teenagers by altering their 
bodies due to prolonged use of video game interfaces. From a Foucaultian 
perspective, game arthritis and the other differently named disorders (the 
“3D Optical Disorder”, “Playstation Thumb”, “Wii Shoulder Dislocation” and 
so on) could be seen to have been brought about by authoritarian statements, 
such as articles in medical journals on the evidence of their emergence, and 
reinforced by mainstream newspapers and video game magazines. However, 
game arthritis and other disabilities are also symptomatic of a deterministic 
narrative, which permeates both the scientific and mainstream discourse. 
According to this view, video games can harm people – a narrative not nec-
essarily dissimilar, in its logic, when reverted through a positive connotation 
(as in Jane McGonigal’s “video games will save the world” slogan). Game 
Arthritis, the art project, displayed in 2011, what should have been the sci-
entific evidence of the studies published in the early 2000s. No evidence has 
ever been found, despite the diseases being analysed in peer-reviewed sci-
entific journals. The photographic “documentation” shocks the viewer with 
its disturbing images, which should appear familiar (as this is what we have 
been told video games can do to our bodies) and yet unfamiliar at the same 
time, as an actual image to prove the alleged effects of digital games has 
never been provided. Also, the images of Game Arthritis do not match the 
current trend of describing video games through positive and celebratory 
narratives as an art form, or as good for health and in preparing the pro-
fessional class of the next generation (as enthusiastically argued, in the first 
5 Documentation of the artwork by Bittanti and IOCOSE is available at http://gamearthritis.
org (accessed May 6, 2014). More information and references are available on IOCOSE’s 
website at http://www.iocose.org/works/game_arthritis (Accessed May 6, 2014).
66
consistent study, by Beck and Wade 2004). It proposes what appears to be 
a sort of conspiracy narrative, according to which the game industry has 
been hiding evidence that would have proved the concerns of the scientific 
community. 
Game Arthritis summarises, through a series of images, a potential nar-
rative of our physical relation with the hardware of the medium. At the same 
time, however, it disputes our tendency to abstract such a relation, allow-
ing deterministic discourses to become institutionalised interpretations. It 
mocks the ways in which video games are transformed into “objects” with 
clear and identifiable effects. Game Arthritis’ move is to ridicule such ab-
straction proposing occurrences, examples of players actually affected by 
their continuous contact with the materials of which video games are made. 
Yet, it is precisely by switching the focus from an abstract discourse to the 
contingent embodiments of which the various “game arthritides” are made 
that game arthritis, the disease that officially existed until about a decade 
ago, is revealed to be a rather uncanny and probably biased narrative.
Game Arthritis is not only a project about the properties of the materials 
from which video games are made; it is mostly about the narratives that we 
(both scholars and gamers) tend to formulate to make sense of our engage-
ment with such materials. The focus is on the human, on the ways in which 
we participate in an environment populated by things, and how we tend to 
abstract them as objects and then resuscitate them by giving them agency, or 
a “sparkle of life”, as Ingold puts it. In Game Arthritis the question is about 
(and the joke is on) us.
When we start thinking about the properties of the materials of video 
games as narratives, then we can also imagine stories, which are intention-
ally false. However, their falsity sheds light on what video games are for us 
and what else they could be. In conclusion, I believe that an approach sim-
ilar to the one proposed by these two examples could also be adopted more 
extensively in the study of games, rather than being exclusively undertaken 
in the artistic context. It would mean focusing less on the alleged effects of 
video games and the ways in which we can channel those effects through 
design, instead concentrating more on what sort of “things” we could bring 
about by living with and through video games. Following Bergson’s notion 
of creativity as that which reconnects to the intuitive faculty of the mind 
and participate in the life of things, I propose to name this potential detour 
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in the study of the medium of the video game as “creative game studies” – a 
proposal that needs, however, to be articulated more extensively in a sepa-
rate context.
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